In “The Mirror Stage as Formative of the I Function,” Jacques Lacan introduces a philosophical conception of the subject into psychoanalysis. He primarily responds to Freud’s conception of the developed subject as an “ego” which serves as a broad referent for the subject’s constellation of raw, biological drives. He thinks the ego as such does not account for the transformation that occurs within the subject when developing an ego, and he deduces the mirror stage as a solution that he thinks even Freud ought to accept. Lacan also responds to philosophy’s Cartesian conception of the subject as the cogito which merely thinks, and thus is. He criticizes this picture for failing to cohere with the transformative biological experience of becoming a subject, but he nonetheless adopts a similar aim as philosophy to know the meaning of ‘I am.’1 My interest in this article will be to argue that Lacan’s mirror stage is an implausible interpretation of Freud, and to suggest that the stage is artificially introduced by Lacan only to fill a lacuna in conceptual understanding, not empirically answer any biological questions, making it virtually useless for psychoanalytic treatment, while nonetheless being philosophically interesting for some readers. ...

Subscribe to Elucidations:       This episode, Matt Teichman and Joseph Diller sit down with Andrew Sepielli (University of Toronto) to talk about metaethical quietism. His new book on the topic, Pragmatist Quietism, is out now from Oxford University Press. Click here to listen to episode 145. Metaethical quietism is the view that ethical statements—or anyway, a large portion of the ethical statements we’re usually interested in—can’t be justified or disproved by statements from outside of ethics. There’s something autonomous about the topic of ethics (or rather, about a lot of ethics). Consider the question: in the scenario where a trolley is barreling down the track, on its way to clobber five people, and you have the ability to divert it to the other track where it will only clobber one, should you do so? According to quietists such as our guest, you can’t answer this question by asking metaphysicians or logicians for help. It won’t do to investigate whether moral facts are part of the furniture of the universe, or to study the grammar of words like ought. The only way you can answer a question like that is, well, whatever we usually do to answer ethical questions. ...

In An Autobiographical Study, Sigmund Freud defines the process of free-association broadly as speaking one’s mind without direction or censorship.1 As Jonathan Lear aptly points out, Freud calls free-association the fundamental rule of psychoanalysis2 not only because it is essential to therapy but also because it is a sublime exercise of the capacity for human freedom.3 Despite this apparent freedom in free-association, Freud also notes: “we must, however, bear in mind that free association is not really free.”4 Indeed, even though the patient is speaking their mind, they are under the influence of the analytic situation.5 My interest in this article will be to explore the meaning of freedom in free-association by attempting to make coherent sense of how this sort of freedom can be both real and illusory. Elucidations hasn’t yet addressed philosophical problems in psychoanalysis, so I’ll be taking the first pass. ...

Subscribe to Elucidations:       This episode, Matt talks to Christopher Beem (Penn State University) about how we can cultivate those skills that conduce to having a functioning democracy. His book on the topic, The Seven Democratic Virtues, is out now from Penn State University Press. Click here to download Episode 144 of Elucidations. ...

Kuhn distinguishes two meanings for ‘paradigm’: in a narrow sense, (1) the examples a discipline uses to articulate its assumptions that set the template for solving puzzles that arise in the discipline during a period of normal science, and in a broad sense, (2) the key theories, instruments, values, and metaphysical assumptions that are made prior to puzzle-solving which constitute the disciplinary matrix of normal science. Count two paradigms ‘incommensurable’ when the new paradigm is a radical alteration of the matrix of measurements, observations, and language adopted by the scientific community not for good reasons but by a non-rational kind of religious conversion to a new world that is different than, and discontinuous with, the one represented by the former paradigm. ...

Subscribe to Elucidations:       This episode, Matt Teichman talks to Mark Linsenmayer about alternative models of education. Mark is creator and host of the Partially Examined Life, Nakedly Examined Music, Pretty Much Pop, and Philosophy vs. Improv podcasts. He is also the author of the recent book, Philosophy For Teens. You can download Episode 143 by clicking here. ...

Subscribe to Elucidations:       We didn’t have a blog yet when this episode came out, but the episode link is here. Thanks to Jasmine Li for the transcription! Matt Teichman: Hello and welcome to Elucidations, a philosophy podcast recorded at the University of Chicago. I’m Matt Teichman. ...

Subscribe to Elucidations:       In this episode of Elucidations, Matt sits down with Emily Dupree to learn about whether it’s rational or irrational to try to seek revenge. Click here to download episode 142 of Elucidations. As a culture, we kinda can’t decide what we think about revenge. Out of one side of our mouths, we talk a big game about letting bygones be bygones, about how revenge and retaliation lead to cycles of violence, and about how nothing good can really come of getting back at people. But acts of revenge, where clearly warranted, also have a visceral moral appeal that it would be absurd to deny. If we didn’t think there were at least some situations in which a person ought to get their comeuppance, then there wouldn’t be so many heroic adventure movies centered around the protagonist’s quest for revenge. When the hero gets back at the villain, it just feels right, like the movie needs to end here and we can all go home; and no amount of pedantic, post-hoc reasoning can ever make that feeling go away. ...

Subscribe to Elucidations:       This time around, Matt sits down with Rob Goodman to talk about political eloquence. Goodman is the author of a new book on this topic called Words on Fire, which you can pick up a copy of wherever you like to get books. As for this interview, you can click here to download episode 141 of Elucidations. ...

Subscribe to Elucidations:       Episode link here. Thanks to Jasmine Li for the transcription! Matt Teichman: Hello and welcome to Elucidations, a philosophy podcast recorded at the University of Chicago. I’m Matt Teichman. Mark Hopwood: And I’m Mark Hopwood. Matt Teichman: With us today is Agnes Callard, Neubauer Family Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of Chicago. And she’s here to talk to us about desire and satisfaction. Agnes Callard, welcome. ...